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NEW METHODS TO OVERCOME ZONING RESTRICTIONS AGAINST TRANSPORTABLE HOUSING
by
James Jay Brown*, J. D., LL. M.

In a country which has just come through a period of abnormal
ly low housing production and now faces the pressures of housing
demand by returning Viet Nam veterans, solutions on how to in
crease the housing supply must be immediate and practical. These
solutions must be in the form of low-cost, decent housing in areas
of moderate to intense urban settlements and not on the rural
fringes away from job opportunities and social contacts. Ameri
cans have prided themselves in their ability to overcome extreme
crises; housing needs and goals are just such a test of that know
how and ability. (1)
Getting lower-cost housing into urban areas regulated by
zoning controls is the most difficult problem facing industrialized
housing manufacturers today. Only in the rare exceptions of
federally-assisted “ demonstration” or model projects are devel
opers and manufacturers able to achieve any breakthroughs. Yet,
it is undisputed that lower-cost manufactured housing is available
and marketable by the mobile home industry, (2) and may be one
answer to urban development on non-tract, scattered residential
lots.
What, then, can be done to open urbanized communities? The
answer will be sought within the explicit and subtle forms of ex
clusion by zoning ordinance definition and case law interpretation
of dwelling. The outcome of such explorations will be in the form
of recommended ordinance changes. The mobile home zoning
cases contain the best directly comparable legal arguments which
provide an analytical comparative basis for predicting resistance
to transportable manufactured dwellings. It is assumed through
out that the existing mobile home industry, as experienced manu
facturers of modular dwellings, is the only group available to
immediately meet a significant segment of lower-cost housing
demand, (3) and that the group can adjust their production methods
to comply with the high performance standard manufactured-home
building codes. (4) It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore
the problems of complying with traditional specification building
codes, which have formed the second barrier to transportable
housing within developed areas.
FUNCTION OF HOUSING REGULATION: Generally
Zoning ordinances as we know them today have their antecedents
in municipal recognition that gunpowder mills, storehouses, and
wooden buildings should be prohibited from heavily populated areas.
As the evils of high density development and occupancy manifested
themselves in the 19th and early 20th centuries, urban tenement
district ordinances began to reflect the desirability of requiring
open space, air, light and ventilation around each and every habited
building for health and safety reasons. Thusly, municipal land
uses are regulated under the broad legal warrant of protecting
health, safety and general welfare, by controlling height, bulk and
lot area and yards for the structure (insuring separations against
fire and providing child play areas); limiting levels of noise, glare,
odor and pollution; restricting street congestion (off-street garages
and parking lots); requiring installation or connection to adequate
utility services; and segregating incompatible physical uses and
future developments (to preserve existing property values). These
have been deemed to be valid police power acts by court decisions
too numerous to recount. What such regulations do not speak to
are the methods, materials and costs of construction; nor do they
address themselves to the precise uses an apparently conforming
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structure may be designed to provide. The zoning of districts for
“ compatible” uses has produced the crazy-quilt pattern so familiar
in every city; a pattern that reflects the battle between vested
land-owner interests and the legitimate growth and natural change
inherent in an urbanization process predicated upon the philosophy
of “ highest and best use. ”
Coincident with the zoning concerns stated above, was the
public concern over building uses within a purely health orientation.
Various health agencies began inspections for compliance under
what we now call a housing code. The objective of such regulations
is the improvement of living conditions from socio-psychological,
as well as sanitary and safety, standards. (6) Where housing
codes have been enforced, the above objectives are generally
sacrificed on the altar of hardship of owners under existing housing
market conditions. (7) Such results are inevitable where the living
environmental concerns of the housing code are applied after the
structural safety concerns of the building code have been satisfied.
Satisfactory human living conditions were assumed under
conventional wisdom, predicated on a laissez faire market philos
ophy, to have been incorporated into all consumer-acceptable,
competitively-priced dwellings. Experience has proved the con
verse and produced varied legal-administrative responses as
solutions, such as combining the functions of building and housing
regulations under one administrative body. Although this may be
unworkable, (8) logic and experience dictate that unless housing
code features are incorporated at the construction stage under
building code regulation, and their cost incorporated within the
primary mortgage they will be unaffordable by subsequent owners.
Fortunately, the regional model building code formuiators and
the mobile home industry are finally becoming aware of technolog
ical advancements by promulgating and adopting performance code
standards and abandoning specification standards, which were un
concerned with and devoid of housing code environmental goals.
Recognizing that the private developers were building structures
safe against the natural elements, code inspectors can now begin
to concentrate their regulatory attentions on the quality of living
conditions within the dwellings.
Even though the new standards are oriented toward structural
problems, the minimum air temperature, plumbing and electrical
guidelines will maintain a living environment more in compliance
with existing housing codes. Manufactured modules which conform
to the new standards unquestionably satisfy code sanitary require
ments by being inherently immune to gnawing rodents and to vermin
which infest conventional urban residential structures. With this
shift in focus, the overlapping goals of building and housing codes
should become recognized and legislative-administrative acts
formulated to unite the goals into a solitary effort to provide decent
housing.
It is within this context of parochial, separated municipal
regulatory activity, devoid of unified goal achievement, that the
dilemma of the lower cost house must be considered. No longer
is it produceable by conventional methods; no longer are land,
financing and promotional costs sufficiently low that new entrepre
neurs can enter the competitive market at this price scale. Only
by manufacturing methods within the mobile-modular field can such
dwellings supply market demands. Quite suprisingly, however,
the mobile home is an anomaly in American planning and zoning.
It has never been seriously considered in official planning litera
ture or practice, yet, in 1969, 6 million Americans inhabited
mobile residences. (9)
APPLICATION OF ZONING: Restriction by Technicality
Zoning ordinance regulation of mobile homes has been most
observable as a restriction to sites within trailer camps under
special requirements as a conditional use (10) and by total exclu
sion from any residential district. (11) Where they are permitted
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as residences, their location has been relegated to agricultural or
non-urban districts, (12) or to an onerous situs in conjunction with
industrial (13) or commercial uses only. (14) The cumulative
effect has been to exclude entirely or relegate the mobile home to
the worst use areas. (15)
The primary regulatory device of the ordinance is the defini
tion per se. If a dwelling is “ a building or part thereof designed
or used exclusively for residential purposes” (16) and a building
is “ any structure designed (or), constructed . . . for the support,
enclosure, shelter or protection of persons . . . except a tent or
trailer, ” then a mobile home ( i .e ., trailer) is not a permitted use
in the R-Single-Family Dwelling District of Richmond, Virginia;
but, is within regulated trailer camps only. (17) This particular
code definition of trailer emphasizes, as so many do, its vehicular
design for highway travel, thereby disqualifying it as a structure
on the characteristic of permanency of attachment to or on the
ground.
To summarize, in defining just what a “ dwelling” is for
zoning and building purposes, municipal ordinances have consis
tently placed heavy emphasis upon a structure’s residential
character (18) as a home, residence, or sleeping place for human
beings. However, although a dwelling unit may be a room or group
of rooms located within a dwelling which forms a habitable unit for
one family, (19) a dwelling for human habitation may not be a
house trailer. (20) Another means of exclusion is to relate duration
of fixation to site as a determination of dwelling permanency.
“ Temporary housing is defined as any tent, trailer, mobile home,
or any other shelter designed to be transportable and not attached
to the ground, to another structure, or to any utility system on
the same premises for more than 30 consecutive days. ” (21)
These forms of classification and restriction, enacted without
stated reasons, have been enforced perfunctorily under various
guises of case precedent.
The Common Law definitional evolution of dwelling has not
been free from ambiguity. Any house in which people dwell might
be considered a dwelling. (22) However, even though a dwelling
has various meanings under the laws of burglary, insurance, home
stead, and real property, the predominant distinguishing character
istic appears to be habitability for man. (23)
Davis v. State (24) held that by looking at the outside facts and
circumstances, use of a building as a dwelling would make it so.
Whereas the character of building occupancy (as a residency for a
family or habitation by man) defines dwelling, the purpose for
which the dwelling was erected may not always be controlling. (25)
However, where a dwelling classification has been made to depend
upon more than the fact that it is a building the use of which is
habitation for man, such an interpretation has been ruled arbitrary
and unreasonable. (26) A dwelling, under an equity interpretation
of a deed restriction, was a house possessing the requisite ele
ments for habitability: four walls and a roof. (27) “ The interior
arrangement within the four walls and under the roof determines
whether the same is a ‘dwelling house’ , or what kind of ‘house’ it
is. ” (28) A structure may be a dwelling house if it is sufficient to
permit one family to reside in it through a 6-month winter. (29)
An old Wisconsin Supreme Court case (30) construed their home
stead statutes to hold that for the property exemption to obtain the
owner must in good faith inhabit the commercially leased structure
as his residence, habitation or dwelling house. (31)
Within the meaning of an Indiana arson statute, a trailer with
out wheels resting on cement blocks was not a dwelling house for
lack of permanent attachment to the realty. (32) Of greater rele
vancy was the four man dissent which challenged that conclusion
first on the grounds that both burglary and arson statutes have the
fundamental concern for preservation and security of home and
habitation. Secondly, a more precise reading of dictionary and
case definitions emphasize the key elements of occupancy of a
building by a family as a place of habitation and residence regard
less of the character of the structure. (33) The dissent assembled
an impressive array of state cases dealing with a variety of
structures, some of which were not permanently affixed to the
earth, yet were held to be dwellings. Finally under the facts
elicited in testimony, the trailer, as affixed to blocks resting on
the earth, possessed all the internal features to make it completely
suitable as a dwelling, and was so used when burned.

Under the law of burglary, a dwelling house is an apartment,
building or cluster of buildings in which a man, with his family,
resides. (34) Thusly, this representative sampling of definitional
cases conveys the common thread of intent to and actual occupancy
for residency purposes. There are no requirements as to the type
of structure or of its permanency, although some support for
permanency of occupation is observable. (35)
Although at first glance, the mobile home would seem to fit
within the definition of dwelling, the recent decisions which test
such meanings reflect a lack of consistency. (36) If a consistency
is identifiable it is within the problematic concentrations of per
manency of attachment to the realty, duration of location in one
place, and mobility.
The case decisions interpreting ordinance definitions are over
whelmingly against permitting residential intrusion of mobile units,
as exemplified in a 1970 case. (37) There have been decisions to
the contrary based upon inadequately drawn ordinance definitions
(38) which do not specifically exclude trailers. (39) Once perma
nently immobilized, a unit may conform to the dwelling terminology.
(40) And, owners who affix the home to the property with the intent
to use it for residential purposes have been held to comply with the
previously identified common law definitions. (41) However, intent,
occupancy, and suitability as habitation may be disregarded in
favor of an overriding concern with the physical facts about a build
ing justifying its exclusion. (42)
When trailer usage is segregated into designated parks, uti
lization of one as a separate unit or as a component part of a build
ing, regardless of suitability for living within a residential zone,
is a punishable offense. (43) The dissenting opinion, herein, was
more discerning than the majority concerning the issue of whether
a structure built off the site was a residential dwelling. Consid
ering the necessities of life, so long as job opportunities are
locally obtainable, the intent to maintain a mobile home perma
nently affixed should be controlling. The interdependency of main
taining a residence and retention of gainful employment were
clearly recognized. Permanency of residence was further identi
fied with mode of taxation. Finally, as long as a mobile unit was
as much a functioning residence as a conventional house rolled
onto a site, and it conformed to local residential regulation, its
manner and place of construction were insufficient criteria on
which to exclude it from residentially zoned districts. The manu
factured unit was entitled to the same regulation and protection
afforded to other dwellings. Anything less would constitute illegal
arbitrary actions.
Fortunately, the overwhelming uninformed legal fixation of
equating transient or temporary living with off-site produced
housing is being whittled away, (see the Sioux Falls, Lescault, In
re Willey, Morin and Crawford cases noted above) by the realiza
tion that any permanent residence, regardless of construction,
can be moved from its foundation to another location. (44)
In a retrospective review of these decisions which conflict
over interpretations of seemingly uncomplicated terms, it becomes
clear that the courts seldom delve into the explicit and implicit
reasons for legislative classification and segregation. The
mechanical restatements of precedent are applied without much
analysis and the pronouncements are more provoking for their
unspoken policy presumptions than for their gymnastics with facts
and ordinances in order to produce denials of use. Unfortunately
a degree of ignorance and hearsay perpetuate these policy pre
sumptions, and the Bench and Bar have been as uninformed as the
legislatures. To complete the understanding of the restrictive
legal decisions, several factual studies will be explored to indicate
the fallacies in and refutability of the underlying presumptions.
Mobile homes are inhabited by lower-class peoples, who are
striving to move up on the economic scale and, therefore, have no
community concern or any permanency. One study’s set of statis
tics disputed this by showing that over 60 per cent of mobile home
dwellers were engaged in some manual or blue-collar work, (45)
while another study reported that within the predominant manual
employee-occupant group there were included a substantial per
centage of skilled and semi-skilled tradesmen. (46) A survey in
New England (47) indicated that mobile homes were used by a
cross section of moderate income households. Almost a fifth of
the occupants were young married couples and another fifth were
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even conventional housing. The terms manufactured or modular
house should be defined to mean units which, as delivered from a
factory or other assembly point, contain completely installed
electrical, plumbing, and temperature control equipment. Perma
nent affixation should be described with the primary significance
placed upon the owner’s intention to make the dwelling stationary
on some kind of stable foundation by the removal of transport
mechanisms.
In conjunction with such definitional improvements, modifi
cations should be made in the residential zone sections of the
ordinance. Permitted uses should include the transportable
dwelling. Lot size and yard requirement site standards should be
flexibly adjustable to modular dimensions. Minimum dwelling
unit standards on interior floor area might be reduced to reflect
the moderate needs of child-less single and young or older couples.
External architectural standards might be established with
reference to existing municipal architectural trends or designs.
Lot coverage and floor area ratios should be adjustable accordingly.
In other respects, the modular dwelling would comply with other
general residential regulations, such as on height and off-street
parking.
The cumulative effect of these first steps in ordinance r e 
vision would be to make it legally difficult for municipal officials
to more restrictively interpret the zoning law against permitted
dwellings. Their guiding public policy would be a forthright pro
motion of new decent housing which incorporates technological
advancements for the greater general welfare. If there is to be a
restriction, it must be predicated upon a factual determination
that the manufactured home is unfit for permanent residential use.
Only after this point has been established can it be maintained that
public regulation of a transportable dwelling is reasonable. Since
this issue of reasonableness involves the definition of dwelling for
human habitation, only objectionable and substandard units would
be excluded under the suggested ordinance revisions. In this way,
the challenge of meeting the existing low er-cost housing demand
might be made somewhat less overwhelming.

older or retired couples. This same survey indicated that econo
mic segregation of what many town residents felt was a lower
income group was one motivation behind some zoning and sub
division regulations excluding the mobile home. (48)
Disregarding for a moment the facts which contradict the
inferior income fallacy, should mobile home occupants c reate a
slum with their allegedly inferior life styles, a depreciated mobile
unit would be easier to remove by either public or private action
than a dilapidated conventionally-built structure.
The presence of a mobile home has an adverse effect upon
residential property values. As an appraiser’s maxim this state
ment would be true regardless of where a house were built if the
new dwelling has a significantly lower value than all surrounding
properties. This is also true where there is a great disparity in
appearance between the new and existing structures, whether the
former is an ultra-modern conventionally-built or an all-aluminum
clad mobile home. But, this is a surface or cosmetic feature of
the transportable dwelling which has been corrected by most major
manufacturers. Bair has maintained that there is no valid plan
ning or economic basis for exclusion where standards of appearance
have been met. (49)
Mobile home residents do not carry their fair share of the
local tax burden. This allegation is not maintainable, either,
when it is realized that the young married and over-55 age group
occupants, 40 per cent of the mobile dwelling occupants as pre
viously identified, do not add to the burden of the school districts
with school-aged children. And, as more jurisdictions decide that
mobile units are permanent affixations to the realty, they become
taxed as real property either by statute or court decree, (50)
thereby supporting municipal services. Equitable real property
taxation is realized in mobile home parks and subdivision zones
also, because taxes are included in the lot rental fee.
RECOMMENDED LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
Clearly, the manufactured off-site dwelling, characterized as
a mobile or modular home, satisfies or can satisfy legal and con
temporary definitions—standards of suitability for habitation. The
unstated policy presumptions underlying official restrictions on
such dwellings are not justifiable, as new socio-economic research
indicates. How then, in light of the present housing crisis and the
long-term national housing goals, can zoning ordinances be co r
rected to permit an equal treatment of these homes ?
The most logical first step would be to factually demonstrate
to the unconcerned municipal officials that the current factorybuilt house is a dwelling, just as suitable and safely habitable as
conventionally-built dwellings within their jurisdictions. A policy
statement, in the form of a purpose clause, should be incorporated
into the zoning ordinance to that effect. Further, municipal
acceptance of environmentally-sound housing, from the building and
housing code objectives, would dictate that it become official
policy to separate transportable dwellings from transient trailers
and vacation campers. The latter vehicles, defined by their us
ability independent from municipal utilities, should be relegated to
locations within designated parks only.
Such a distinction, formulated to overcome misconceptions
about legislative intent, sets the stage for the deletion within rele
vant ordinance sections of restrictions against homes of a mobile
nature. Establishing a definitional distinction between types of
manufactured units would foster more legal precision among legis
lators, lawyers and administrators. It is an unfortunate fact that
in the cases analyzed for this study, the term “ tra ile r,” with all
of the explicit evil connotations from the ‘30’s and ‘40’s, was used
when referring to a permanently immobilized 1970 dwelling.
Definitions within the ordinance should be redrafted to exclude
arbitrary restrictions against mobile homes as dwellings and
against buildings not possessing load-bearing exterior walls.
Dwelling should be written so as to include ready-for-humanoccupancy, off-site manufactured units, which are intended to be
securely affixed to a foundation and, which are dependent for
occupational use upon connection to public utilities. Minimum
floor areas and exterior finishes might be designated, also.
Duration of permanent attachment may not be a necessary require
ment in view of the cost of affixation and the potential movability of
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